Фальсификации или домыслы: опыт выборов в России и в Украине
Beginning with the first round of Russia’s 1996 presidential election, through the December 26th third round of Ukraine’s presidential contest, this essay examines the fingerprints of fraud found in election returns aggregated up to the level of Russia’s 2500+ and Ukraine’s 225 rayons. Our object...
Збережено в:
| Видавець: | Iнститут соціології НАН України |
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| Дата: | 2005 |
| Автори: | , , |
| Формат: | Стаття |
| Мова: | Russian |
| Опубліковано: |
Iнститут соціології НАН України
2005
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| Назва видання: | Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг |
| Теми: | |
| Онлайн доступ: | http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/90120 |
| Теги: |
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| Цитувати: | Фальсификации или домыслы: опыт выборов в России и в Украине / М. Мягков, П. Ордешук, Д. Шакин // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. — 2005. — № 2. — С. 116–155. — Бібліогр.: 21 назв. — рос. |
Репозиторії
Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine| Резюме: | Beginning with the first round of Russia’s 1996 presidential election, through the
December 26th third round of Ukraine’s presidential contest, this essay examines the
fingerprints of fraud found in election returns aggregated up to the level of Russia’s
2500+ and Ukraine’s 225 rayons. Our objective is to develop methodologies for
detecting and measuring fraud that do not rely on eyewitness accounts of electoral
irregularities, but which instead can be detected in official data. The evidence we offer
as establishing a `crime’ is necessarily circumstantial, but we are reminded that those
who `facilitated’ Putin’s 2004 reelection also helped orchestrate the campaign of the
Kremlin’s choice of successor to a retiring President Kuchma. If crimes are often solved
with reference to a culprit’s modus operandi, then the things we label fingerprints of
fraud ought to exist in the official data of both countries. And indeed they do —
especially when we compare Putin’s success in 2004 with the patterns of voting that
emerged subsequently to favor Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine. Our secondary objective
is to measure the extent of electoral fraud, and here we conclude that Putin’s success at
avoiding a second round vote against his communist challenger in 2004 was aided and
abetted by upwards of 14.5 million falsified ballots and that between 1.5 and 3.5
million suspicious votes account for Yanukovich’s illfated November 21st “victory”. |
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