European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї |
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| Datum: | 2009 |
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| Sprache: | Englisch |
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Інститут політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України
2009
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| Zitieren: | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine / G.P.E. Walzenbach // Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї. — К., 2009. — Вип. 16. — С. 335-355. — Бібліогр.: 91 назв. — англ. |
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| author | Walzenbach, G.P.E. |
| author_facet | Walzenbach, G.P.E. |
| citation_txt | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine / G.P.E. Walzenbach // Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї. — К., 2009. — Вип. 16. — С. 335-355. — Бібліогр.: 91 назв. — англ. |
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| container_title | Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї |
| first_indexed | 2025-12-01T22:31:49Z |
| format | Article |
| fulltext |
335
Dr. G.P.E. Walzenbach
University of the West of England, Bristol
eUroPeaN goverNaNCe aNd traNSformatIoN
IN UkraINe
ЄВРОПЕЙСьКЕ УПРАВЛІННя ТА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ
В УКРАЇНІ
1. the european Governance Perspective in the transition context
It is generally agreed that social scientists and students of transition want the
good society [1]. Frequently, in the context of East and Central Europe this political
goal is connected with membership and active participation in the European
Union (EU). As a consequence, the European Commission’s vice president Günter
Verheugen expects that in 20 years from now all ‘European countries’ will have
joined this organization [2]. His optimistic expectations about the future prospects
of the integration process, however, are qualified by an important exception:
countries of the post soviet space such as Russia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine
are unlikely to become part of the club [3]. While not all parts of the political elite
or the general public in these countries have been disappointed by this statement,
it received considerable attention by the political community of Ukraine with its
‘post Orange Revolution’ confirmation of a ‘European choice’ and the resulting
expectation of having or being able to gain a clear membership perspective [4].
For the time being, the enlarged Union prefers to limit its activities to the
export of its own governance model to this and other parts of the world in a ‘one
size fits all’ approach that embraces democratic structures as the key ingredient
to solve socio economic problems with the help of newly emerging, open civil
societies [5]. Accordingly, the official take on ‘good governance’ demands ‘the
transparent and accountable management’ of a country’s resources to achieve its
equitable as well as sustainable economic and social development. Typically, this
comes with strong normative claims as to the linkage with specific institutional
arrangements and the demand for an unbiased participation of individuals in
the legislative process that acknowledges criteria such as expertise, efficiency,
accountability and transparency [6]. Hence ‘good governance’ relies on the
formation of political, economic, social and cultural associations themselves
subject to mutual controls and public oversight. It requires, moreover, a set of
standard mechanisms in public administration that will implement policies by
determining the distribution of bureaucratic and financial powers across different
levels of government. Finally, it asks for an independent judicial system equipped
with the ability to enforce sanctions and to ensure compliance with political
decision making [7].
While there is no shortage of domestic obstacles to the initiation of respective
democratisation processes in the EU’s neighbourhood, they have not prevented
several observers from identifying a number of caveats to these strategic goals
deriving from the supranational organization’s own internal practices. Among
336
those familiar with academic writings on the subject matter complaints about a
‘democratic deficit’ and the inconsistent pursuit of policy objectives would hardly
come as a surprise. Indeed, the mismatch between resources directed towards
third countries for the actual improvement of governance arrangements and
the rising pressures towards their speedy economic liberalisation places some
question marks behind a genuine European style of democracy promotion [8]. If
the Union in its external relations exclusively promotes governance arrangements
in close congruence with internal mechanisms rather than in relation to the
specific political, economic and social constraints of a neighbouring country, it
might sooner or later have to deal with a number of unintended consequences
given the low institutional capacities and the poor implementation record found in
most transition contexts [9].
Alternatively, in a less benevolent interpretation, the motives of the Union
to develop a foreign policy towards post soviet transition countries might be more
firmly rooted in economic interests [10]. Gaining and granting market access
through the gradual extension of co operation agreements offers a potentially more
rewarding activity for both sides not the least because it could combine notions of
conditionality with an assessment of progress made in terms of political reform.
In fact, EU relations with Ukraine can serve as a crucial test to this proposition as
the by and large delayed transformation process after independence was revived
in the aftermath of a highly politicized presidential election in 2004. Since then
Ukraine has gained the status of a free market economy from both the EU and the
United States, opening the way towards a replacement of a dated EU Ukrainian
Partnership and Co operation Agreement and a more recent Action Plan through a
new, more forward looking document. In addition, the immediate prospect of the
country joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is seen as a key step to tie
even closer economic links with Europe [11].
At the same time, and in line with the EU’s perception as a ‘soft power’, such
agreements come at the price of the acceptance of an underlying set of ideas, norms
and values which might not easily travel into another territory. This is particularly
problematic since the New Neighbourhood Policy (NNP) fundamentally rests
on the assumption that the ‘European model’ has gained so much attraction
that it could convince a ‘ring of friends’ to adopt major elements of the acquis
communautaire without having the prospect of full membership. This obvious
contradiction, while perfectly understandable from the EU’s own ‘inside out’
perspective with the functional imperative to combine internal and foreign policy
goals, appears far more pronounced from the ‘outside in’. In other words, buying
the European model abroad will be far more difficult than selling it at home
(while, for some at least, the latter is already difficult enough). The commitment
of post soviet states such as Ukraine to reform their political system along the
blueprint of the EU’s new member states, and Poland in particular, may become
a constant source of disappointment and disillusionment, if for opportunistic
reasons specific institutional designs, operating principles and procedural rules
are artificially separated from the major components of a common market in terms
of policy output and welfare gain.
337
Therefore the question suggests itself to what extent Ukraine, given its unique
domestic constellation of political forces, will be able to move closer to a particular
system of governance championed by the EU. Without reviving the long standing
debates about the country’s belonging to a Western or Eastern cultural tradition, it
can be argued that the recent enlargement round has, if anything, erected significant
barriers to catching up with other member states from East and Central Europe.
This follows, first of all, from the absence of a viable EU accession strategy and
hence a lack of constant social pressure to follow a road map and intermediate
milestones leading to full membership. In this respect, the NNP constituted a
fundamental break with the earlier ‘wider Europe’ strategy of the Commission,
where still an attempt was made ‘to manage its new vulnerability towards its
neighbours through a strategy similar to that applied during enlargement’ [12].
Secondly, taking institutional capacity building seriously and understanding
European ‘external governance’ arrangements as inspired by notions of multi-
level governance (MLG), the chances for successful implementation in the
post-communist states are frequently considered as low given ‘the importance
of the pre-existing territorial distribution of power within states’ [13]. Thirdly,
seen from Brussels the need to respond to the ‘economization of international
politics’ and to construct a larger system of governance that regulates financial
and monetary globalization could reduce a general ‘East European problem’ – let
alone ‘regiolateral’ and single country issues – to a fairly minor point of concern
[14].
This chapter, therefore, examines the theoretical status of MLG beyond
the immediate reach of integration studies. It proposes to adjust the multi level
perspective to the transition context for two reasons: On the one hand, to be able
to employ a framework of analysis that does recognise the complex nature of
Ukrainian efforts to integrate with European structures. On the other hand, to
provide a realistic yardstick along which potential progress in the long term goal of
Ukrainian EU membership could be evaluated. Not surprisingly, as a fairly recent
conceptual innovation, MLG is still undergoing significant modifications and
reformulations. As a consequence, each of the following sections will highlight
differences between a standard set of MLG assumptions as present in the work
of Hooghe and Marks and an ‘extended version’ (MLG x) built around a broader
range of European contributions [15].
The latter tries to overcome some of the weaknesses of ‘governance thinking’
once applied to a particular transition country and, thus, attempts to capture better
major developments in Ukrainian politics before and after the ‘Orange Revolution’
of November 2004. Whether Ukraine can be considered to be ‘safely’ on the
path towards an EU style system of governance will be assessed with regard to
the democratic features of its emerging political system, the competing role of
alternative integration schemes and, finally, the influence of non state actors in the
form of business interests.
338
2. multi-level governance and democratisation
Within Ukrainian political elites European integration is a constant option
debated for the country’s future. However, for many observers it remains doubtful
whether behind the implicit rejection of closer ties with Russia there stands an
actual desire to transfer and share sovereignty with supranational institutions
[16]. The fundamental problem how to bring system transformation into harmony
with system integration into supranational structures remains largely unresolved.
Arguably, integration with the East has lost many of its preconditions, but a truly
proactive and creative policy for the rapprochement with Western institutions is
likewise not in sight [17]. Therefore, Ukrainian efforts to become a member of
the EU run the risk to become foremost a declaration of political intent without
a corresponding intention to make progress in the implementation of policies
facilitating system transformation. In other words, foreign policy intentions
of full EU membership are not connected to internal reforms, even though the
‘framework for Ukraine’s integration into European structures’ is set by its own
domestic development, or more precisely, the way and speed with which Ukraine
develops its political, economic and societal systems in line with the Copenhagen
criteria [18].
Of course, asking for stable public institutions, a market economy and a
strong civil society is inherently difficult in a country where state-building was a
delayed process. Since Ukraine still is a ‘defective democracy’ and its relatively
new constitution has only limited reach there are two different types of democratic
deficits. At the same time, a weakness of EU-style representative democracy
follows from its institutional development ‘as an offspring of national institutions
that claim sovereignty in their respective territories’ [19]. Although the formal
powers of both the European Parliament (EP) and the Ukrainian Parliament have
been extended to address their perceived ‘democratic deficits’, this cannot hide
a fundamental difference between the two institutions: in the EU-15 the liberal
democratic state was ‘an outcome of state building’ before it became ‘the point of
departure for European integration’ [20]. In the case of Ukraine, by contrast, there
appears to be the need to achieve both simultaneously.
How, if at all, is it possible to compare the problem of democratizing Ukraine
with the problem of democratizing the EU? In the case of the latter Arthur Benz
identified a ‘trilemma’ of the existing MLG arrangements: In the highly complex
institutional structures of an enlarged Union the three promises of democracy
as efficient decision-making, effective interest intermediation and public
accountability are not easily fulfilled. In normative terms, he argues, the linkage
of any particular national system of governance with the EU would have to rely on
a ‘balanced system of division of competencies between existing institutions that
impedes the fusion of powers as well as the uncoupling of processes in various
arenas’ [21].
While such a balancing requirement appears particularly remote for current
or aspiring accession countries, it is also worth noting that the existing record of
MLG has not turned the EU into a benevolent organization. As Guy Peters and
Jon Pierre have pointed out, European bargaining and negotiation processes are
339
hardly free of traditional power politics, the steering capacity of EU institutions
towards common goals might be sometimes low, some of their key policy
problems can remain without solutions and the regular resort to informal decision-
making processes might exacerbate inequalities among the participating political
actors [22]. How, then, can EU external policies upgrade respect for constitutional
rules and democratic control processes in aspiring member states in its immediate
neighbourhood?
In theory, at least, the language of MLG does also apply to the transition
context of Ukraine. According to Hans van Zon, a ‘diffusion of authority’ has
also taken place resulting in a ‘multi-layered policy-making body’ with various
branches of government and bureaucracy producing considerable legislative
output, albeit with only limited real consequences due to poor interdepartmental
and cross-sectoral co-ordination [23]. In addition, it seems that the carriers of this
co-ordination burden are frequently appointed on the basis of political loyalty
rather than technical expertise. The Ukrainian state appears as having little control
over the implementation of decisions despite the existence of an oversized inherited
administrative apparatus. This ‘loss of control’, however, is not (as in traditional
MLG accounts) due to participation in integration schemes, but a consequence
of the break with an old, soviet style, control mania and the simultaneous lack of
enforcement mechanisms for ‘new rules of the game’.
In fact, Taras Wosnjak sees here the cause for the long-term maintenance of
the status quo in Ukrainian politics despite an existing transformation in its actual
form of government [24]. He claims that after the collapse of the Soviet Union
the traditional party-political nomenclatura was able to use its receding power
more effectively than other groupings from within society sincerely interested in
a democratic transition. Consequently, for the old elite a ‘new project’ became
possible by deliberately refocusing on administrative techniques and internal
governance arrangements rather than by proposing and concentrating on a set of
economic reforms per se.
Thus, even from a ‘governance’ angle the mixed record of the Ukrainian
political system does not necessarily come as a surprise. On the negative side,
for example, a respective list could include an unaccountable presidential
administration, slow progress in general administrative reforms and widespread
corruption in addition to the unsolved issue of intergovernmental relations [25].
The highly praised, new Ukrainian constitution has not led to a clear delineation
of competencies between President and Parliament, the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet. Moreover, the aftermath of the 2006 parliamentary elections highlighted
once more the serious difficulties of political elites to comply with institutional
prerogatives and to place executive power in a coalition government despite
contending social forces. Therefore, Eberhard Schneider’s earlier description of
Ukraine as a ‘defective democracy’ with non-liberal tendencies has continued to
gain ground. As expected, certain policy areas are excluded from the political
process and political actors find it hard to stick to the doctrine of a separation of
powers under all circumstances [26].
Ultimately, only punctual equilibria have (re-) emerged combining formal
340
democratic institutions and informal practices in network-type arrangements.
While it is true that after the introduction of a new constitution in 1996 the formal
transformation of Ukraine progressed rather quickly, this creation of classic state
institutions marked the move towards a presidential system where a single figure
at the top could make authoritative decisions and exercise control over the state
apparatus with the help of decree powers. In this context Keith Darden observed
already during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma the vital role played by informal
mechanisms [27]. In his account these ‘serve to expand the scope and resources
of presidential authority’ whenever there are problems of implementation and
compliance [28]. By granting approval to the selective violation of laws through
state officials, for example, the political leadership ensured the implementation
and compliance with key projects and regularly enhanced its capacity to govern.
In breaking with this past, President Victor Yushchenko, explained the
resignation of his first post-revolutionary cabinet as mainly driven by the
forthcoming parliamentary elections rather than by any deterioration of personal
relationships [29]. Thus he did perceive these events in much more pragmatic
terms than the general public: Not a drama or tragedy, but merely a testing ground
for the interplay of democratic political forces. By stressing his integrity, the major
blame was put on a badly organised presidential staff and ministerial support
structure still tight to inherited structures and operating under the assumption that
administrative reform could only succeed through political repression or the use
of bribery.
Indeed, MLG-x has also pointed to co-ordination processes occurring
outside formal procedures and institutions. Its conceptual affinity with network
approaches, though, does lean to a more benevolent interpretation in reference to
EU practices. Here they provide welcomed mechanisms to escape deadlocks and
the risks of actual ‘ungovernmentability’ [30]. Less attention is paid to the fact
that such informality sometimes comes at the price of less accountability not only
along the horizontal axis between the EU Council, the European Parliament and
the Commission, but more importantly, in the vertical interaction with national
governments and their parliaments.
Nevertheless, in its external presentation and perception, the credibility of
the government’s new pro-EU orientation could not be doubted and has been
associated with clear progress in terms of institutionally guaranteed democratic
rights and freedoms. The package deal between contending forces, for example,
which opened the way for a re-run of the presidential elections at the end of 2004
reduced presidential powers and passed on the right to appoint a prime minister
to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament [31]. Therefore, the latter upgraded
its credentials as a regular ‘focal point’ for the settlement of political conflicts
and paved the way for the first free parliamentary elections since 1994 [32].
Equally important in maintaining the credibility of the system’s transformative
capacity during a serious political crisis has been the country’s Supreme Court.
In institutional terms it managed to perform the function of an independent and
neutral arbiter ensuring the rule of constitutional law and shying away from
informal mechanisms of problem-solving [33].
341
Overall there are more encouraging signs that such macro-changes may slowly
filter through to improve the credibility of internal governance arrangements.
Some of the higher ranks of the civil service at least have shown their willingness
to co-operate with the ministerial bureaucracy in EU member states to modernize
their internal operation via twinning arrangements as part of the NNP [34]. At
this stage, limits as to department choice and project selection are obvious,
though there is an attempt to link this with complementary institutional changes
manifest in the reconfiguration of European affairs throughout the organisation
of government [35]. Along the blueprint of multi-level arrangements in the ‘old
member states’ all ministries have created the post of junior minister for European
affairs and announced the creation of sectorally-defined divisions responsible for
the implementation of a combined EU-Ukrainian action plan [36].
3. alternative regulatory frameworks?
The post-soviet space offers rich opportunities to distribute authority through
a variety of international, intergovernmental and supranational organisations.
Accordingly there is a complex set of constraints on current or prospective
memberships and a potential relocation as well as dispersion of political control
functions along the governance approach in international relations. At the same
time, prospective multi–level arrangements do not sideline questions of hierarchy
in terms of specific institutional powers vis-à-vis individual countries and with
regard to the delineation of competencies in various, functionally determined
policy areas.
At first sight, international authority beyond the EU seems to be primarily
allocated in an international system consisting of a plurality of states and with
an unequal distribution of power among them. Yet the variation and diversity
among a secondary range of international institutions offers initial support to the
application of a graduated governance concept. Together they form a complex
set of constraints for nation states and could indicate (depending on their precise
features and mechanisms) a move towards ‘more governance’ as well as ‘more
government’. In the words of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye these do not
replace the nation-state as the primary instrument of domestic and global policy
formation, but the latter’s centrality as a political entity is ‘being supplemented’
by other actors [37]. In a more reductionist fashion, James Rosenau, qualifies the
concept of MLG as capturing exclusively ‘governmental levels’, albeit with the
explicit recognition of an additional international level in the interplay of local,
regional and national institutions [38].
Fur the purpose of this section it is important to qualify their competing
features also in terms of power relations. Due to differences in the extent of their
‘contractual relations’ and simultaneous presence in similar or related policy areas
a degree of hierarchy would be considered necessary to reduce complexity and
simplify day-to- day policy-making. Frequently, differences follow from their
functional tasks and under certain circumstances it might be possible to establish
‘a kind of hierarchy across functions’ since some constraints on nation states are
more important than others [39].
342
After the collapse of East European forms of co-operation a de-politicization
and economization of East-West relations set in that turned the EU into the
‘dominant pan-European actor’ [40]. Its ambition to be recognised as a civilian
power followed a tendency to rephrase external problems of an enlarging and
deepening Union in economic-political terms [41]. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the EU had declared in analogy to the common strategy for Russia a common
strategy for Ukraine already at the end of 1999. Following the EU-Ukraine
summit in September 2000 political dialogue and practical co-operation in trade
matters intensified, followed by a resolution of the EP in March 2001 interestingly
not excluding the prospect of Ukrainian EU membership. In December of the
same year, the Commission strategy paper for the period from 2002-2006
promised support for the Ukrainian efforts in institutional, administrative, legal
and private sector reform as well as in the softening of the social consequences
of transformation [42]. In these documents, however, no offer of a long-term
membership perspective appeared and the term itself was, if anything, consistently
avoided [43].
Before the ‘Orange Revolution’ the state of EU-Ukrainian relations could
be described as one of mutual disappointment as over a period of ten years since
the ratification of the Political Co-operation Agreement (PCA) little had been
achieved [44]. Especially with regard to the reconstruction of economic relations
the expected deepening did not occur. In part this was due to a misunderstanding of
the internal workings of the EU as an economic union providing cheap finance and
a mere forum for the settlement of regulatory issues before trade relations would
pick up again. In part, however, this too was related to a lack of EU foreign policy
capacity given the immediate enlargement context and an ongoing crisis situation
in South-East Europe. Moreover, the EU’s assistance programme (TACIS) lacked
political visibility and success in Ukraine [46]. Thus, the subsequent embedding
of EU-Ukraine relations in the NNP was largely seen as a defensive Western
strategy because of its dominant focus on safe borders, international crime and
migration rather than on the unresolved questions of economic modernisation.
Although the basic element of the EU co-operation scheme was said to be the
‘free movement’ of goods, services, capital and persons, its widely publicized
interpretation of ‘everything but institutions’ led to a pessimistic assessment of
any future bilateral agenda.
On the other hand, the NNP was supposed to offer a closer connection for
the participating states with the EU than before. In comparison to previous forms
of co-operation there is the explicit expectation for an extended dialogue and an
increasing participation in the common market. The stepwise implementation is
supposed to take place through negotiated action plans specifying how countries
such as Ukraine can move closer to the EU. The aim in the long run is not
membership as such, but the harmonization of laws, industrial norms, regulations
and standards allowing for the full participation in the single market. If realized,
the action plan would deliver in its substance significantly more than a mere free
trade agreement after Ukraine has become a member of the WTO [46].
Indeed, immediately after the ‘Orange Revolution’, the EU and Ukraine
343
agreed on the 13 December 2004 on an ‘action plan’ identifying 14 main tasks
with a clear scope for mutual co-operation. The plan effectively extended the
previous agenda and restated goals and objectives along functionalist expectations
in a number of policy areas: the strengthening of the stability and effectiveness
of democratic and judicial institutions, the maintenance of freedom for media
and public opinion, collaborative efforts in questions of disarmament and security
policy, WTO accession and the fight against corruption, the introduction of tax
reforms and the improvement of the investment climate as well as requirements
concerning the mutual visa-regime [47].
The action plan’s logic was to ‘put the ball back in Ukraine’s court’ as
there is the potential for its reach to be extended to other policy areas only once
progress has been made in terms of actual implementation [48]. Clearly, with
co-operation in some key areas initiating and supporting spill-over effects into
new areas functional integration could be strengthened. Accordingly, the 9th EU-
Ukraine summit held on 1 December 2005 in Kiev could confirm closer economic
partnerships in areas such as energy policy, space programmes and transport
infrastructure. On this occasion, Ukraine also acquired the status of a ‘market
economy’ confirming, in the words of Commission President Jose Manuel
Barroso, that the country’s future is ‘in Europe’ [49].
For the time being, however, the EU’s own ability to reduce the gap between
external expectations and pan-European capacities is fairly limited. In conceptual
terms, therefore, a notion of ‘multi-layered’ governance (or MLG-x) appears
more appropriate to come to terms with Ukraine’s location in a third or fourth
layer of countries with little prospects for immediate membership and delayed
implementation records for their internal reform projects. In congruence with
the EU’s own internal development co-operation in its neighbourhood could
be extended only after the abolishment of trade barriers and barriers to the free
movement of people has opened up ‘new opportunities for functional integration’
[50].
To be sure, the EU treaty states that any European country can apply for
membership and the well–known ‘Copenhagen criteria’ add further detail on what
conditions would have to be fulfilled before a positive decision could be reached.
Yet, it almost goes without saying, achieving progress in the realisation of action
plans would mean for any potential candidate the subscription to a technocratic,
bureaucratic and domestic politics-oriented approach of ‘europeanised’ policy-
making [51]. Inevitably, therefore, future membership negotiations after the
accession of Romania and Bulgaria will have to be conceived as an open process,
with the regular review of the implementation record in light of the acquis
communautaire and a constant threat to suspend negotiations if internal reforms
are considered insufficient or not forthcoming [52].
In anticipation of such serious constraints other integration schemes might in
the long run (re-) gain some attraction. While it is impossible to establish at this
stage of development a clear hierarchy between competing integration projects,
there are different assessments as to their potential implications and practical
feasibility. From the perspective of Ukraine two of them deserve particular
344
attention. First, in September 2003, the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Ukraine signed a formal agreement on the establishment of a Single Economic
Space (SES) with the intention to move progressively towards
‘an area consisting of the customs territories of the participants,
where the mechanisms of economic regulation are intended to ensure the
free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour; where a common
foreign trade policy is carried out, and fiscal, monetary, and foreign-
exchange policies are coordinated to the extent needed in securing fair
competition and macroeconomic stability’ [53].
Obviously in analogy to other ‘multi-level’ and ‘multi-speed’ integration
schemes these objectives were thought to be achieved gradually with individual
countries determining the required adjustments, though with the view to create
eventually a ‘single commission’ governing all policies and a decision-making
system with each member state controlling voting rights proportional to its economic
size [54]. Even though Ukraine remained sceptical about this particular scenario
and rejected the formation of common institutions and a common currency, many
observers have continued to speculate about the potential of an East-EU and its
implicit farewell to credible EU (‘West’) ambitions. After a contested ratification
process of the respective agreement by the Ukrainian Parliament in April 2004
the debate did not stop and, instead, continued to generate several conflicting
interpretations.
Of course, since the break-up of the Soviet Union many proposals for closer
association have been made regardless of their chances for success. Standard
assessments qualify them as temporary ‘declaration of intent’ without far-reaching
implications or lasting relevance given the impact of the ‘Orange Revolution’ and
the reorientation of political forces in the parliamentary election of 2006 [55]. Yet,
precisely for the same reasons the SES (or revised versions thereof) could have
more to offer than a purely symbolic meaning. The debates surrounding it have
an undeniable potential to become an indicator for the increasing use of economic
power by Russia and suggest a ‘partial solution’ to the specific bilateral problems
with Ukraine in the cheap supply of energy resources. Alternatively, it could also
lend support to the idea of Ukraine moving closer ‘to Europe with Russia’ denying
any contradiction between the participation in the first stage of the SES as ‘a free
trade agreement’ and the simultaneous application of EU standards on Ukrainian
territory [56]. This appears even more plausible after the EU has articulated its
own priority for the formation of a Common Economic Space (CES) with Russia
[57].
This second important integration scheme, however, does neither suggest
nor establish a simple hierarchy as the envisaged elaboration of ‘four common
spaces’ will be conducted within the previously existing Political Co-operation
Agreements between the EU and the Russian Federation. In line with MLG–x,
the political idea of a Common Economic Space (CES) has the aim to establish
an open and integrated market between the enlarged EU and Russia with the
help of a gradual removal of obstacles to trade and investment, the initiation of
voluntary regulatory convergence, the facilitation of trade and the development
345
of an adequate infrastructure network [58]. In addition, the EU side expects a
selective export of its internal acquis in three related spaces – or areas of co-
operation – referring to matters of external security, justice and home affairs as
well as cultural affairs including the areas of scientific research and education
[59]. Unfortunately, and in contrast to the initial expectations articulated by some
of the new EU member states, the framework agreed upon at a number of EU-
Russia summits in Rome, Moscow and St. Petersburg did not travel well to other
neighbouring countries in Eurasia, including Ukraine [60]. This, in part, explains
the new emphasis on the ‘sui generis’ character of the CES even though it shares
with the SES model a fundamental problem: How, if at all, is it possible to achieve
the effective implementation of an international agreement on a common standard
or a harmonised norm in the absence of sustainable, long-term institutional
capacities to oversee compliance?
In this situation, the EU’s role in external negotiation processes seems to
have served as a reminder to the other parties involved that Ukraine continues
to occupy a rather uncomfortable position between the enlarged Union and the
Russian Federation. While the EU is right to stress that a hidden project of state-
run capitalism stagnating in authoritarianism cannot be integrated into a truly
European design, the remaining elements of ‘stagnarchie’ in Ukraine for themselves
have no real interest in the civilisation of policy formation along any particular
integration model [61]. As a consequence, and similar to the ‘pre-revolutionary’
constellation, the official statements as to the meaning and sustainability of the
country’s ‘European choice’ have to be handled with care.
In some ways, and bearing in mind the protracted process of forming a
governing coalition in early 2006, this brings back memories of Leonid Kuchma’s
pragmatic approach to balance Ukrainian national interests between East and
West with a ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ simultaneously maintaining and
developing relations with Europe, Russia and the United States, while avoiding
the articulation of any irreversible choices [62]. The political elites of Western
Ukraine, by contrast, expect major political as well economic progress only from
closer co-operation with the EU and NATO [63]. Yet, a realistic assessment of
this alleged preference for a Westernised foreign policy doctrine could, at the
same time, not be understood as an outright rejection of Russian ambitions for the
larger region [64]. The geo-political location of Ukraine does make it impossible
to ignore the interests of its large Eastern neighbour. At a conceptual level MLG-x
reveals a potential for closer ties between the EU, Russia and Ukraine without
erecting new geographic barriers or entering esoteric debates about the ‘true’
meaning of Europe. At any rate, Ukrainian self-interest properly defined seems to
direct more attention to the question of how to achieve domestic transition rather
than to the possible choices of extra-territorial allies for this project [65]. In fact,
breaking with the past could, for example, also mean to decide to stay for the
foreseeable future out of formal integration schemes, regardless of whether they
show more Western or Eastern leanings [66].
More pragmatically, and giving preference to MLG-x beyond the EU,
membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) became one of the top
346
foreign policy priorities of the Yushchenko presidency. It continued to be seen as
a major guarantor for a forward-looking restructuring of the Ukrainian economy
and as a fundamental prerequisite for any further association agreements with the
EU. Soon the issue of membership turned into an important test case for the ability
of the newly formed political forces of the ‘Orange Revolution’ to deal with the
powerful representatives of industrial lobbies who reject membership because of
their anticipated exposure to foreign competition specifically in the agricultural
and steel producing sectors. What is more, a working system of MLG-x initiated
by WTO membership could be undermined if Russia succeeded earlier in similar
efforts of joining and, thus, could reintroduce its control not only on oil and gas
supplies but on bilateral trade relations between the two countries more generally
[67].
In this respect, the ‘pre-Orange Revolution’ agreement on the SES contained
an important modification to some of the other co-operation schemes entered by
independent Ukraine: It contained a behavioural commitment by the signatories as
to their national positions taken in future membership negotiation. The respective
guidelines specify that
‘if one member enters the WTO before others, it will promote the
earliest entry into the WTO of other SES members and, once WTO
negotiations are under way, to refrain from advancing demands of their
own.’ [68]
The problems of ‘post-revolutionary’ Ukraine with such a ‘non-aggression
principle’ are obvious. Yet with the lack of an alternative integration project the
creation of a negotiated tree trade area via the WTO appeared after all as the
least demanding option. As Ukrainian trade relations continue to be unevenly
dispersed between several regional markets it is unlikely that they alone would
determine a fundamental reorientation towards the EU or Russia [69]. While it
is true that the EU and the Russian Federation have pursued their own style of
enlargement policy, they both have so far failed in substantially increasing their
political-institutional weight and integrationist reach in Ukraine or, as one could
add, in Belarus and Moldova [70].
Therefore, integration may simply be too big a word to capture the intricacies
of these relationships. As long as the pursuit of any deeper regional arrangement is
interpreted by a significant part of the domestic political spectrum as an outright
rejection of their preferred vision deadlock is likely to occur. For this reason a
multilaterally defined version of MLG-x appears to be the only viable option
to steer Ukraine out of its current limbo-situation. As a one-sided, traditional
MLG model would only stir further conflicts it seems sensible to try and free
political actors from the constant pressure to reach ‘final decisions’ or to make
‘fundamental choices’. In the polycentric world of the 21st century it appears more
appropriate to seek multilateral links not only with neighbouring states but with
a larger range of international institutions and regulatory regimes. In this respect
the country’s positioning between two centres of gravity should also offer rich
opportunities for lasting socio-economic change. Such a multilateral framework
for change, then, would in harmony with MLG-x assumptions place much more
347
emphasis on the desirability of a non-hierarchical dispersion of authority. Taking
on board the geopolitical realities of Ukraine in this way would, in the eyes of
many observers, undoubtedly offer more opportunities for the construction of a
successful state [71].
4. Private interests as public actors
Even more complications in the application of the MLG framework must be
expected when acknowledging the role of private actors and, in particular, business
interests in the transformation process of Ukraine. In its basic conception firms
and governments will accept the need for a structured development of regulations,
though may disagree about their precise anchoring in national, supranational or
international institutions. Morevover, for MLG-x to work it would be sensible to
establish a close linkage with notions of ‘corporate governance’, especially in the
Ukrainian context, where financial-industrial groups (or ‘clans’) hold substantial
functional and organisational power easily extending into the regulatory sphere
of government [72].
Thus, the general governance notion according to which private companies
and non-state actors increasingly do ‘what public actors used to do’ experiences an
interesting re-interpretation once set in the environment of a post-soviet system.
No doubt, there too is a ‘blurring of public-private spheres of action’ with ‘public
governance not independent of private governance’, but the complementary
extension of these country-specific arrangements into an international system of
MLG remain severely constrained [73]. For the time being, it is unlikely that
Ukrainian business groups will operate effectively in multiple arenas, bargaining
with each other, ‘with a variety of national governments, and with transnational
actors, including intergovernmental organizations and transnational activists’
for the purpose of strengthening the horizontal enforcement of European or
international regulations [74].
Like other countries in East-Central Europe, Ukraine pursued a gradual
privatisation programme bringing up state property for sale on a case-by-case
basis. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to speak of a resulting ‘predominance’
of the non-state sector in the economy as reportedly two-thirds of major capital
assets remained in state hands. The public-private distinction holds in so far as
considerable subsidies and regulatory oversight continued to be provided by the
state though with comparatively little international involvement, for example,
in the form of foreign business partners [75]. Consequently, privatisation has
been particularly slow in ‘classic’ capital-intensive sectors such as energy,
transport and telecommunications and within sectors belonging to the former
military-industrial complex [76]. Given the considerable difficulties of devising
an effective competition policy in both the EU and WTO, institutional changes
upgrading governance capacity for the enforcement of legislation in these areas
would be crucial for a working system of MLG-x [77].
The extent to which the current patchy domestic regulatory arrangements
in the form of committees and commissions can be integrated into supra- or
international arrangements remains doubtful. Already in the early stages of the
348
privatisation process, long before the events leading to the ‘Orange Revolution’,
the involvement of regional administrative elites undermined an egalitarian
redistribution of property rights. Instead, the specificities of privatisation in
Ukraine led to the formation of an extensive ‘private-public’ network. At various
levels, this strengthened the influence of businessmen (or ‘clan members’) on
political decision-making processes as well as the direct say of state administrators
on their business conduct [78].
Interestingly, it was then Prime Minister Julia Tymoshenko, who decided
in post-revolutionary Ukraine to dissolve ‘Special Economic Zones’ comprising
about 500 individual business projects benefiting from tax exemptions and low
regulatory burdens, thus effectively creating a major rift between business interests
and the newly elected government [79]. To make things worse, she disagreed
with President Victor Yushchenko who claimed that over the last 14 years 90 per
cent of privatisations were concluded according to the letter of the law. In his
view, questioning the legality of those previous transactions and opening a debate
about potential re-privatizations of up to 3000 companies could only be highly
detrimental to the country’s overall economic performance [80].
With conflicts developing inside the ‘Orange Revolution’ coalition, the
problems in (re-) defining business-government relations did not disappear. The
subsequent formation of the Yekhanurov government indeed saw the limitation of
the re-privatisation issue to two cases and, more importantly, marked an end to the
populist ‘bandits to prison’ terminology discrediting the activities of the business
oligarchs in general terms [81]. The latter now became a new ‘national bourgoisie’
fulfilling vital (and ‘good’) functions for society as a whole. Indeed, it is the short
legacy of the first ‘post-Orange Revolution’ government that has created a major
obstacle for Julia Tymoshenko to regain the top seat in government, despite
the relative strong showing of her party in the 2006 parliamentary elections. In
stark contrast to the European privatisation experience and the EU’s competition
regime, the highly politicised nature of domestic public-private relations in
Ukraine continues to indicate a trade-off between gaining credibility in domestic
(electoral) politics and gaining credibility in dealing with EU institutions in
Brussels [82].
Similarly, Mlg-x is unlikely to work in the ‘post-Orange Revolution’
environment as long as privatization is not accompanied by substantive changes
in the Ukrainian system of corporate governance [83]. The decision to opt
for a gradual reform process in the early 1990s had the downside to prevent
the emergence of institutional mechanisms effectively constraining the rent-
seeking behaviour of individual firms and their management. By including
multiple bureaucratic interests into negotiations about the scope and substance
of regulatory control rights, these actors have been able to exploit the old links
with the ministerial bureaucracy and with sub-national authorities to their own
personal benefit [84]. As the transfer of specific control powers to supranational
and international institutions would be vital in an emergent system of MLG,
strong resistance against any such change from the ‘insiders’ of the system must
be expected.
349
In this situation, incentives leading to a diversification in the composition
of corporate capital and creating effective control mechanisms over management
behaviour are missing. The existing legislative norms are likely to be used
defensively and against any independent welfare-oriented exercise of control
powers. As a consequence, there is an insufficient flow of foreign capital and
Western businesses find it difficult to operate according to the ‘typical’ Ukrainian
rules of the game [85]. Precisely because it is difficult to break with the ‘anti-
investment tradition’ of post-soviet countries and the overriding imperative
of transnational capital to ‘differentiate carefully between economic sectors,
countries and regions’, a parallel simultaneous construction of MLG is highly
desirable, but not easy to achieve [86].
Another element of MLG-x, the building of transnational coalitions and
horizontal forms of co-operation across boundaries by economic actors, was
likewise strongly biased before the Orange revolution. To some extent, this
was also a consequence of the socialist past when co-operation with other
economic systems had been excluded for ideological reasons. Moreover, in the
case of Ukraine, nation-building was much closer affiliated with the elaboration
of a ‘national strategy for domestic recovery’ than with the aim to achieve
competitiveness on world markets [87]. For the best part of the 1990s it seemed
that the governing elites had little interest in opening up further to either European
or Russian investments as both would easily outperform any generic ‘Ukrainian’
business alternatives, therefore, leaving no other choice than to opt for a defensive
strategy [88].
Until the revolutionary changes of 2004 it appeared as if the ‘third way’
foreign policy in Ukraine could be best understood as a struggle between
competing oligarchic formations connected with diverging external economic
interests revealing either a strong Russian or Euro-atlantic preference. To some
extent, however, the policy changes introduced immediately after the ‘Orange
Revolution’ have effectively upset the biased pursuit of business interests and
resulted in a more balanced pursuit of the related political interests, not exclusively
in national fora. Surely, Ukrainian business circles share, similar to their Russian
counterparts, a certain reluctance when it comes to the implementation of an
EU inspired co-operation scheme championing competitive structures in capital
intensive industries which at the same time are the focus of their traditional rent-
seeking activities. On the other hand, the ‘penetration of the Ukrainian economy
by foreign, especially Russian, capital’ is now counteracted by an increased
availability of credit lines from international financial institutions and an improved
eligibility for EU regional funding as part of the NNP [89].
A working system of MLG-x with regard to government-business relations
is still in its infancy. On a more positive note, though, transnational economic
forces have started to play a more pronounced role in ‘post-revolution’ Ukraine.
Rather than betraying the aim and spirit of the ‘Maidan’, the timid steps towards
a rapprochement between its two major antagonists in the aftermath of the 2006
parliamentary election could also be interpreted as a sign of the normalization
of democratic processes. It is particularly remarkable in this respect that the EU
350
membership ambition articulated by most political parties in the Verkhovna Rada
has been qualified by an influential part of the Ukrainian business community as
an inclusive idea that comprises a move ‘to Europe with Russia’ [90]. Of course,
from the EU’s own perspective, MLG set in the non-institutionalized context of
the NNP, would quite logically demand such a combined approach. An external
border with both countries after the latest enlargement round does not have to
stay in the way of Ukriane’s transnational relations and, in turn, could help to
effectively use a complementary economic potential once product norms and
standards have been brought closer into line.
5. conclusion: crowding out ‘good governance’?
The case of Ukraine as a transformation country with ambitions for EU
membership highlights some of the problems with extending notions of MLG to
the wider European context even when significant policy externalities do exist.
It suggests at this stage a good deal of scepticism to grant this conception of EU
policy-making far reaching theoretical or explanatory power beyond its own legal
boundaries. As a framework of analysis it is generally useful, if only to identify and
highlight the limitations of the export of any particular governance model to the
wider European neighbourhood. For some time to come the EU will have to rely
on soft instruments of co-ordination in order to increase its sensibility to culture
and country context and not to undermine democratisation efforts appropriate for
a particular stage of political development.
Table 1
effects of ‘orange revolution’ on change in Governance
arrangements
mlg mlG-x
democratization formal institutions
+
informal mechanisms
+ / –
alternative frames hierarchical structure
–
non-hierarchical
+
Business Interests public-private partnerships
+ / –
transnational coalitions
+
+: positive ; –: negative; +/–: neither positive nor negative
In general terms the effectiveness of the EU’s own pursuit of external objectives
such as democracy and good governance is difficult to judge, also because
the Commission itself did resist the temptation to devise indicators of success
[91]. The arguments presented in this chapter therefore qualify the expectations
about any democratisation strategy in Ukraine. Seen from a comparative angle
the immediate events of the ‘Orange revolution’ have resulted in a by and large
positive move in the direction of MLG-x. This extended governance model,
however, constitutes also a break with the more traditional EU integration project.
351
A finding that is, presumably, not to the liking of all political forces in Ukraine. On
the one hand, it clearly rejects the notion that EU involvement in its current form
would crowd out domestic democratisation efforts. On the other, it describes a
more uncertain future depending on whether multi-level arrangements beyond any
particular regional integration scheme will be able to provide sufficient structure
to facilitate system transformation.
Finally, by concentrating on only three aspects of governance arrangements
(see Table 1), this chapter avoided to address some of the more fundamental
problems in Ukrainian society. These are considered to be more firmly rooted
in failed attempts to accommodate regional diversity and to proceed uncritically
with the formation of a national identity rather than in the specific design of any
particular governance arrangement. Yet, if both of these essentially political
projects were to succeed, MLG-x would be among the first indicators to register
such fundamental change.
1. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 47th Annual
Convention of the International Studies Association, 22-25 March, 2006, San
Diego, California. The author wishes also to acknowledge the support of the Open
Society Institute during his posting as a Resident Scholar in the Department of
International Relations and Diplomatic Service at the Ivan Franko National
University of Lviv, Ukraine. 2. Anatoliy Halchynsky, “A Response to Verheugen”,
The Day 7, March 7 (2006) 3. Thus repeating his earlier, equally pessimistic,
assessments reported in Inna Pidluska, “Ukraine and the EU – What Prospects for
Integration,” in The EU and Ukraine, ed. Ann Lewis, (London: The Federal Trust,
2002), 183–4. 4. Walter Mayr and Christian Neef, “Schauen Sie in mein Gesicht,”
Der Spiegel, no. 52, December 24 (2005): 106–9. 5. Reimund Seidelmann,
“European Union and Eastern Europe,” in European Union and New Regionalism,
ed. Mario Telò (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 199–200. 6. Karen E. Smith, European
Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 133–4. 7.
This refers also to countries not within the immediate neighbourhood of the
European Union. See with special reference to Vietnam, David H. Lempert,
European Community: Policy and Practice on Governance and Democracy
(London: One World Action, 2004). 8. Smith, Foreign Policy, op. cit., 144, note 4.
9. Iris Kempe and Wim van Meurs, “Europe beyond EU Enlargement,” in
Prospects and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement, ed. Iris Kempe (Opladen: Leske
and Budrich, 2003), 19. 10. Mary Farell, “The EU and Inter–regional Cooperation:
in Search of Global Presence?” in The Political Economy of European Integration,
ed. Erik Jones and Amy Verdun (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 131–3.
11. Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, Grenzen und Horizonte der EU (Hamburg:
Körber–Stiftung, 2005), 62; and Taras Kuzio, “Yushchenko’s First Year: A Mixed
Balance Sheet,” The Ukrainian Observer 67, no. 6, February (2006): 12. 12.
Sandra Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’,” Journal of
European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 694. 13. Ian Bache, “Multi level
Governance and European Union Regional Policy,” in Multi level Governance ,
ed. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
352
178. 14. Seidelmann, “Eastern Europe,” op. cit., 197, note 3. 15. See, for example,
the collection of articles in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, ed., Multi level
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Beate Kohler Koch, ed.,
Linking EU and National Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003);
G.P.E. Walzenbach, ed., European Governance: Policy Making between
Politicization and Control (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 16. Jerzy Maćków, Am
Rande Europas?(Freiburg: Herder, 2004), 278. 17. Ibid., 282–3. 18. Kirk Mildner,
“Ukraine and the EU: Lessons Learned and Tasks Ahead,” in Prospects and Risks
Beyond EU Enlargment, ed. Iris Kempe (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2003),
133. 19. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi level Governance and European
Integration (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 41. 20. Ibid., 41. 21. Arthur
Benz, “Compounded Representation in EU Multi level Governance”, in Linking
EU and National Governance, ed. Beate Kohler Koch (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 106. 22. B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, “Multi level Governance and
Democracy: A Faustian Bargain?” in Multi level Governance, ed. Ian Bache and
Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 86–8. 23. Hans van
Zon, The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine (London: Macmillan, 2000),
25–6. 24. Taras Wosnjak, “‘Projekt Ukraine’ – Bilanz eines Jahrzehnts,” in Die
Ukraine, Polen und Europa, ed. Renata Makarska and Basil Kerski (Osnabrück:
Fibre, 2004), 67–9. 25. Mildner, “Lessons Learned,” op. cit, 134, note 17. 26.
Eberhard Schneider, Das politische System der Ukraine (Wiesbaden: Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 152–4. 27. Keith Darden, “Graft and Governance:
Corruption as an Informal Mechanism of State Control,” (New Haven: Yale
University, 2003), http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs//Graft%20and%20
Governance.pdf (accessed September 30, 2006). 28. Ibid., 28. 29. In the speech
given by President Yushchenko to the 5th International Economic Forum ‘Ukraine–
EU’, October 5–8, 2005, Lviv, Ukraine. 30. Benz, “Compounded Representation,”
op. cit., 104, note 20. 31. With hindsight, of course, this constitutional change can
also be seen as a causal factor leading to numerous problems and deadlock
situations in the formation of a new government after the 2006 parliamentary
elections. See, for example, Olesya Oleshko, “Dismissal of the Government”, The
Ukrainian Observer 67, no. 6, February (2006): 8. 32. Kuzio, “First Year,” op. cit,
10, note 10. 33. Nathaniel Copsey, “Popular Politics and the Ukrainian Presidential
Election of 2004,” Politics 25, no. 2 (2005): 104. 34. At the time of writing four
such projects had been approved dealing with electricity regulation, anti trust, civil
aviation and administrative standard setting. See, Natalya Huzenko, “European
Union Provides Funding,” The Day 7, March 7 (2006): 2. 35. Eberhard Schneider
and Christoph Saurenbach, “Ukraine – die zweite Transformation,” Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik–Aktuell 59, (2004): 2. 36. Ibid.; in the early phase of the
re organisation a new Ministry for European Affairs was created separately from
the Ministry of Economics. The head of this new entity – Olen Rybachuk – held
also responsibility for the general co ordination of European politics within the
government administration. 37. See Robert O. Keohane and John S. Nye,
“Introduction,” in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye and
John D. Donahue (Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
353
2000), 12. 38. James N. Rosenau, “Strong Demand, Huge Supply: Governance in
an Emerging Epoch”, in Multi level Governance, ed. Ian Bache and Matthew
Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31–32. 39. Stephen Welch and
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “Multi level Governance and International Relations,” in
Multi level Governance, ed. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 134. 40. Seidelmann, “Eastern Europe”, op. cit, 189, note
3. 41. Ibid., 190–1. 42. Schneider, Ukraine, op. cit., 147, note 25. 43. Kempe and
Meurs, “EU Enlargement,” op. cit., 60–1, note 8. 44. Klaus Schneider, ‘The
Partnership and Co operation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and the EU –
Idea and Reality’, in Ukraine on the Road to Europe, ed. Lutz Hoffmann and
Felicitas Möllers (Heidelberg and New York: Physica, 2001), 66–78. 45. Ukraine
received 460.8 million ECU from the EU Tacis programme (1991–99). See for a
critique Kempe and Meurs, “EU Enlargement,” op. cit., 61–2, note 8. 46.
Gesprächskreis, Horizonte, op. cit., 62, note 10. 47. For further criticism on the
proposed action plan, see Kataryna Wolczuk, “Ukraine after the Orange
Revolution,” Policy Brief (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005), 4, http://
www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_ukraine_feb2005.pdf (accessed September 30,
2006). 48. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2005), 190. 49. See Andriy Novak, “EU grants
Ukraine Market Economy Status,” Kyiv Weekly 44, December 7 (2005): 4. 50.
Kempe and Meurs, “EU Enlargement,” op. cit., 75, note 8. 51. Gesprächskreis,
Horizonte, op. cit., 48, note 10. 52. Ibid., 81. 53. Lúcio Vinhas de Souza et al.,
“Now So Near, and Yet Still So Far: Economic Relations between Ukraine and the
European Union,” Kiel Discussion Paper, no. 419 (2005): 19–20. 54. Ibid., 20. 55.
See, for example, Rainer Lindner, “Die Ukraine zwischen Russland und der EU
– Anmerkungen zu einer aktuellen Debatte”, in Die Ukraine, Polen und Europa,
ed. Renata Makarska and Basil Kerski (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2004), 24-6. 56. See,
for example, Tim Gould, “The European Economic Area: a Model for the EU’s
Neighbourhood Policy?” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 5, no. 2
(2004): 191; and Boris A. Shiriaev, “On Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy,” in
Post-Communist Countries in Search for Security and Stability, ed. Konstantin
Khudoley (Saint-Petersburg: Saint-Petersburg State University Press, 2005), 111.
57. For a Russian perspective, see Yuri S. Kuzmin, “Russia–EU relations after
Fifth Enlargement,” in Post–Cold War Challenges to International Relations, ed.
Yury Akimov and Dmitri Katsy (Saint-Petersburg: Saint-Petersburg State
University Press, 2006) 171–2. 58. Pekka Sutela, “EU, Russia, and Common
Economic Space”, BOFIT Online, no. 3 (Helsinki: Bank of Finland Institute for
Economies in Transition, 2005), 29. 59. Ibid., 26. 60. For Timofei Bordachev, for
example, the idea of an EU-Russia Common Economic Space ‘is still meaningless’
and suitable only for a debate ‘on a purely theoretical level’. See his “Europe’s
Russia Problem: Immediate Concerns and Long–term Prerequisites,” in Prospects
and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement, ed. Iris Kempe (Opladen: Leske and Budrich),
101. 61. Wosniak, “Projekt”, op. cit., 85–6, note 23. 62. See, for example, Taras
Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma (London: Macmillan, 1997), 179–226; and Ilya
Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
354
Press, 1998), 388–92. 63. Schneider, Ukraine, op. cit, 151, note 25. 64. Rawi
Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2001), 119–20. 65. Lindner, “Anmerkungen,” op. cit., 17, note
54. 66. See, for example, Abdelal, Purpose, op. cit., 121, note 63; who states that
‘of all the post-Soviet states, Ukraine certainly was the only one in the 1990s to
attempt to have partial membership in both the CIS and the EU.’ 67. Maryan
Polyoviy, “One Year of the Orange Government,” Kyiv Weekly, no. 42, November
23 (2005): 11. 68. Souza et al., “Economic Relations,” op. cit., 20, note 52. 69.
Marko Bojcun, “Trade, Investment and Debt: Ukraine’s Integration into World
Markets,” in Reforging the Weakest Link, ed. Neil Robinson (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2004), 59. 70. For the case of Belarus see, for example, Alex Danilovich, Russian–
Belarussian Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 71. See with references to
several such ‘multilateral arrangements’: Lindner “Anmerkungen,” op. cit., 26–7,
note 54; Anatoliy Orel, “Ten Years On: Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” in
The EU and Ukraine, ed. Ann Lewis (London: The Federal Trust, 2002), 137;
Schneider, Ukraine, op. cit., 143–6, note 25; Oles Verbnyk, “Uniting in the Name
of Democracy”, Kyiv Weekly, no. 44, December 7 (2005): 4; and Wosniak,
“Projekt”, op. cit., 74, note 23. 72. Zon, Political Economy, op. cit., 178–82, note
22. 73. Maria Green Cowles, “Non–state Actors and False Dichotomies: Reviewing
IR/IPE Approaches to European Integration,” in The Political Economy of
European Integration, ed. Erik Jones and Amy Verdun (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005), 30. 74. Virginia Haufler, “Globalization and Industry Self–
Regulation,” in Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition,
ed. Miles Kahler and David A. Lake (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2003), 231. 75. Souza et al., “Economic Relations,” op. cit., 19, note 52. 76.
Hence the regular demand by institutional investors to complete the privatization
process and to develop a consistent competition policy. See, for example, Hans
Holzhacker, “Ukraine – Entscheidung im März,” CEE–Report 4 (Vienna: Bank
Austria Creditanstalt, 2005), 21. 77. Igor Burakowskij identifies several strategies
employed by business to circumvent market principles. See his
“Wirtschaftsreformen: die Kluft zwischen Erwartungen und Ergebnissen,” in Die
neue Ukraine, ed. Gerhard Simon (Köln: Böhlau, 2002), 214. 78. Ibid., 217. 79.
Mayr and Neef, “Gesicht,” op. cit., 108, note 3. 80. In the speech given by
President Yushchenko to the 5th International Economic Forum ‘Ukraine–EU’,
October 5–8, 2005, Lviv, Ukraine. 81. See Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner,
“Faded Orange”, Financial Times, March 24 (2006): 11; and Kuzio, “First Year,”
op. cit., 11, note 10. 82. After the 2006 parliamentary election Yulia Tymoshenko,
former Ukrainian prime minister, encountered considerable difficulties in her
attempt to re establish credibility with the Ukrainian business community as well
as the EU Commission. She stated in an interview with the Financial Times: ‘My
name was absolutely artificially connected with reprivatisation in order to discredit
me.’ See Tom Warner, “Ukraine Ex Premier in Business Pledge,” Financial Times,
March 30 (2006): 6; and the interview with Olen Ribachyk, then President Viktor
Yushenko’s chief of staff, by Stephen Suckar on BBC international, Hard Talk,
May 2 (2006). 83. See Vladimir Sobolev and Vladimir Lazarenko, “Models of
355
Corporate Governance and Employee Participation: Pecularities in Ukraine and
Russia,” (Kharkov: Kharkov National University, 2001), http://www.sses.com/
public/events/euram/complete_tracks/corporate_governance/lazarenko_sobolev.
pdf (accessed September 30, 2006). 84. In both Russia and Ukraine this is said to
have led to a system of ‘multi-level corruption’ and with business practices
controlled by the old nomenclatura. See, for example, Anastasia Nesvetailova,
“From ‘Transition’ to Dependent Development: The New Periphery in Global
Financial Capitalism”, in Reforging the Weakest Link, ed. Neil Robinson
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 128; and Wosnjak, “Project”, op. cit., 77, note 23. 85.
Burakowskij, “Wirtschaftsreformen”, op. cit., 217, note 76; President Yushchenko
also stressed for that very reason the need for a new dialogue between business
and government to reduce the regulatory burden for both national and international
investors. See his speech at the 5th International Economic Forum ‘Ukraine–EU’,
October 5–8, 2005, Lviv, Ukraine. 86. Nesvetailova, “Periphery”, op. cit., 135,
note 83. 87. Bojcun, “Integration,” op. cit., 52, note 68. 88. Ibid., 59; Abdelal,
Purpose, op. cit., 117, note121. 89. Bocjun, 2004: “Integration,” op. cit., 59, note
68; Holzhacker, “Entscheidung,” op. cit., 21, note 75. 90. Most commentators had
already agreed that even a new (old) Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich would
still have to give priority to ‘European integration’ in the sense of closer co-
operation on a practical level and the construction of Ukraine as a ‘Russia-EU
bridge’. See Gesprächskreis, Horizonte, op. cit., 52, note 10. 91. Michael
Dauderstädt, “Exporting Stability to a Wider Europe: From a Flawed Union to
Failing States,” Europäische Politik 10 (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004)
1–19.
С. Юрченко
яЛТИНСКАя КОНФЕРЕНЦИя 1945 ГОДА: ПРИНЦИПы
ФОРМИРОВАНИя МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ СИСТЕМы
В ПЕРЕГОВОРАх СТАЛИНА, РУзВЕЛьТА И ЧЕРЧИЛЛя
Ялта, как место, где вырабатывались основы нового мирового порядка,
складывавшегося в результате Второй мировой войны, стоит в одном ряду
с такими городами как Мюнстер, что в Вестфалии, где в середине XVII
века подводились итоги Тридцатилетней войны и закладывались основы
Вестфальской системы международных отношений; как австрийская Вена,
где были подведены итоги изменений в Европе и мире рубежа XVIII-XIX
веков; как французский Версаль и американский Вашингтон, где подводились
итоги Первой мировой войны и создавалась новая мировая система –
Версальско-Вашингтонская. При этом конференция «большой тройки» в
Ялте в 1945 г. обладала тем своеобразием, что это была не итоговая мирная
конференция, а конференция войны и победы в войне, что, несомненно,
наложило отпечаток на принимавшиеся здесь решения и конфигурацию
Ялтинской или Ялтинско-Потсдамской системы международных отношений,
|
| id | nasplib_isofts_kiev_ua-123456789-26569 |
| institution | Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine |
| issn | 1810-5270 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-12-01T22:31:49Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Інститут політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | Walzenbach, G.P.E. 2011-09-06T08:32:50Z 2011-09-06T08:32:50Z 2009 European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine / G.P.E. Walzenbach // Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї. — К., 2009. — Вип. 16. — С. 335-355. — Бібліогр.: 91 назв. — англ. 1810-5270 https://nasplib.isofts.kiev.ua/handle/123456789/26569 en Інститут політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї Міжнародна політика та міжнародні відносини European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine Європейське управління та трансформації в Україні Article published earlier |
| spellingShingle | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine Walzenbach, G.P.E. Міжнародна політика та міжнародні відносини |
| title | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine |
| title_alt | Європейське управління та трансформації в Україні |
| title_full | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine |
| title_fullStr | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine |
| title_full_unstemmed | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine |
| title_short | European Governance and Transformation in Ukraine |
| title_sort | european governance and transformation in ukraine |
| topic | Міжнародна політика та міжнародні відносини |
| topic_facet | Міжнародна політика та міжнародні відносини |
| url | https://nasplib.isofts.kiev.ua/handle/123456789/26569 |
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