Фальсификации или домыслы: опыт выборов в России и в Украине

Beginning with the first round of Russia’s 1996 presidential election, through the
 December 26th third round of Ukraine’s presidential contest, this essay examines the
 fingerprints of fraud found in election returns aggregated up to the level of Russia’s
 2500+ and Ukraine’...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг
Date:2005
Main Authors: Мягков, М., Ордешук, П., Шакин, Д.
Format: Article
Language:Russian
Published: Iнститут соціології НАН України 2005
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Online Access:https://nasplib.isofts.kiev.ua/handle/123456789/90120
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Journal Title:Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Cite this:Фальсификации или домыслы: опыт выборов в России и в Украине / М. Мягков, П. Ордешук, Д. Шакин // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. — 2005. — № 2. — С. 116–155. — Бібліогр.: 21 назв. — рос.

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Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
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Summary:Beginning with the first round of Russia’s 1996 presidential election, through the
 December 26th third round of Ukraine’s presidential contest, this essay examines the
 fingerprints of fraud found in election returns aggregated up to the level of Russia’s
 2500+ and Ukraine’s 225 rayons. Our objective is to develop methodologies for
 detecting and measuring fraud that do not rely on eyewitness accounts of electoral
 irregularities, but which instead can be detected in official data. The evidence we offer
 as establishing a `crime’ is necessarily circumstantial, but we are reminded that those
 who `facilitated’ Putin’s 2004 reelection also helped orchestrate the campaign of the
 Kremlin’s choice of successor to a retiring President Kuchma. If crimes are often solved
 with reference to a culprit’s modus operandi, then the things we label fingerprints of
 fraud ought to exist in the official data of both countries. And indeed they do —
 especially when we compare Putin’s success in 2004 with the patterns of voting that
 emerged subsequently to favor Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine. Our secondary objective
 is to measure the extent of electoral fraud, and here we conclude that Putin’s success at
 avoiding a second round vote against his communist challenger in 2004 was aided and
 abetted by upwards of 14.5 million falsified ballots and that between 1.5 and 3.5
 million suspicious votes account for Yanukovich’s illfated November 21st “victory”.
ISSN:1563-4426