Звернення Миколи Штейнберга

• Видавець: State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety
• Дата: 2022
• Автор: Steinberg, Nikolai
• Формат: Стаття
• Мова: Ukrainian
• Опубліковано: State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety 2022
• Онлайн доступ: https://nuclear-journal.com/index.php/journal/article/view/956

Dear Colleagues, especially Colleagues from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant! I have been connected with the Chornobyl NPP site for 51 years, and although I have not worked there for a long time, I cannot be aside of it. In 1983 I went to work at another nuclear power plant, in May 1986 I returned and worked as the ChNPP Chief Engineer until March 1987. Then we also used word “war”: a lot of military personnel were at the facility. There is such a saying: “A shell does not hit the same target twice.” Unfortunately, this happened and I should express my sincere gratitude to the guys who got through all this. Thank you for your courage and high sense of responsibility. Unfortunately, for many years we were all brought up for a delicate politically correct discussion. We select streamlined statements, hide the meaning, which we try to find then. Unfortunately, we pay dearly for it. Today we pay with war. In February, a full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine started: Chornobyl NPP was invaded, then Zaporizhzhya NPP was occupied, and the nuclear installation was hit by shells in Kharkiv, a city with a million inhabitants. During this time, we have never heard any non-political figures associated with nuclear activities, so-called experts ... after all, there is not just a threat of using nuclear weapons, but a global nuclear catastrophe resulting from severe accidents at NPPs. It struck me and I still cannot understand why the nuclear community is silent. Is it afraid to affect the prospects for the development of nuclear energy? Does not a severe accident reject the prospects for the development of nuclear energy? Approximately six months ago, on all TV screens, on all possible websites, the shining faces of the leaders of international nuclear organizations, including the IAEA, leaders of the World Nuclear Association, World Association of Nuclear Operators, vigorously advocated the development of nuclear energy, which will save the world from climate change, said that the future is in the development of nuclear energy. Where are all these people today? I faced a similar situation 31 years ago. When in the late 1980s, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many different meetings were held in Europe to assess safety of our NPPs and plan activities in this area. The situation occurred in spring, I was in Brussels. In the morning, a picture is shown on TV in the hotel lobby: a small river, a bridge across it. On one side there are fuel trucks, on the other side there are two tanks. The tank fires and the fuel truck explodes. I can't understand anything in French, but a colleague, the head of the Slovenian regulator, comes up and says, “It's in Slovenia. The Serbs attacked. A nuclear power plant is a few kilometers from this place. I ask: “What is its condition?" Answer: “It is under operation.” I say: “Shut down the NPP and cool at an emergency rate!”. Now I am comparing the situation in 1991 with 2022. Then, for several hours, statements by representatives of the European Union, tough statements by NATO appeared, and by the end of the day all hostilities in this region had ceased, and, as I am not mistaken, Slovenia withdrew from Yugoslavia a few days later. 2022, the third month of the war, and the nuclear community is silently watching the situation in Ukraine. I drew conclusions, although they may be wrong. 30 years ago, phrase “nuclear safety” was on the ears of the whole world. These words were a guide for real actions. The world, if not understanding the details, felt what nuclear safety is. Today, these words are of little concern to anyone, they mean little, and phrase “safety culture” at the present time is like advertising personal care products on boards. 30 years ago, experts were the leaders of the nuclear industry at all levels around the world. Today, in the hierarchy of decision makers, there are a large number of lawyers, financiers, etc. who are interested in making a profit and do not really understand nuclear safety. 30 years ago, in the political leadership of the world, I mean certain countries and political organizations, there were people who saw and still remembered the war, first of all, they understood very well what it meant. Therefore, words “peace” and “nuclear safety” were synonymous words. This means that when there is a nuclear power plant on the territory of a country, then peace is guaranteed and there are no crazy people who will go there with weapons. I was convinced of this, probably, and maybe not only me, but we were wrong. In order to clearly state what is happening, it is necessary to return to the definition of “technical goals of nuclear safety”. If not literally, this is the prevention of NPP accidents, ensuring that all accidents are taken into account in NPP design, even those that can happen with a low probability, taking into account radiological consequences and, if they occur, reducing their impact, as well as reducing the likelihood of occurrence of significant radiological consequences. This is the classic definition that is applied in all our documents. Of course, we need to talk about severe accidents, because all other events and failures do not pose a serious hazard to personnel, and even more so to the public. It is fundamental that all the technical goals of nuclear safety should be taken into account in the design. There is no recommendation or requirement in any of the international or national documents for the inclusion of resistance to attack by up-to-date weapons in the design basis of a nuclear power plant. What is taken into account by standards is the impact of a tornado, shock wave, hurricane or tsunami and it is not comparable to the impact of up-to-date weapons. Do our standards recommend any countermeasures against up-to-date weapons? Also no. A lesson in the history of human existence: in the constant struggle for the means of attack and defense, the means of attack have always won. Under hostilities, safety of nuclear power plants cannot be ensured. The consequences of such actions are not taken into account and cannot be taken into account in NPP design. There are hundreds of scenarios to consider, but nuclear safety of a nuclear power plant cannot be ensured in a war. Another very important factor is human. The psychological stress that the ChNPP workers have undergone and conditions in which Zaporizhzhya NPP personnel are now working are extremely difficult. What about the direct use of weapons against personnel? However, these are technical aspects, there are also political and legal aspects. A nuclear facility captured by an aggressor, this means that there is no physical protection and guard of the facility in accordance with the license terms. The guard provided by the aggressor is not physical protection. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has been violated. The whole system failed. Who is responsible for what in this situation? The emergency preparedness system has failed. Equipment may be preserved, but the organizational structure has failed. People working in this system are not present. Along with the system of insurance of nuclear risks, the system of liability for nuclear damage has failed. Who is responsible for this, who will provide compensation? What do we get in the end? Technical safety is not ensured, legal aspects of safety has failed, and today there is only one structure left - operational and maintenance personnel, who continue to work in a situation when at any moment NPP configuration will not meet any design conditions. The license to operate a facility is issued on the basis of a safety analysis report that clearly defines the limits and conditions for operational safety. They are not available today, but the facility is operated. The personnel took on significant responsibility. These people are the only ones keeping the facility safe today, and they need to be protected. This is the task of the Operator and the Regulator. There have been many talks over the past three months, but no actions, no laws. The Verkhovna Rada works around the clock, the Government works, but where are the proposals for personnel protection? After all, if there is no law, then any consequences for the personnel can be. Therefore, today this is a great problem that needs to be addressed. To date, we do not have legal documents regarding exploitation in war. Finally, about the international nuclear safety regime – there is no such regime. It failed. Today there are two countries that have withdrawn from the nuclear safety regime. This is Ukraine attacked by the aggressor, the legal regime of whose nuclear facilities is indefinite and does not meet the provisions of international legal documents. The second is the aggressor country, which I have no desire to talk about. These are not people with whom you can do legal business. However, today an important point is being missed: the top leadership of the nuclear industry of the aggressor country are among the invaders. The commander of a tank that entered the Zaporizhzhya NPP may not know what kind of facility it is and how to behave there, but the Chief Engineer of an NPP from another country cannot but know that he has no right to be there. In criminal law there is the concept of unintentional and intentional. The Russian military man, the tank commander, acted unintentionally, because he was ordered to, and the Chief Engineer of the occupying country acted intentionally, but we are silent about it. The state and international organizations authorized to consider such cases do not have the courage to declare a global threat to nuclear safety. The IAEA Board of Directors, in accordance with the Charter, should immediately appeal to the UN Security Council about the violation of the nuclear safety regime in the world and violation of the conditions of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The war has been going on for three months and no one has appealed. There are only tourist visits of officials to the liberated territories. Unfortunately, the Operators (operating organizations) of NPPs are timidly silent. Their colleagues are killed. Really killed, not in the picture. However, silence in response. The regulatory body has the same neutral position. When I sent an open letter to the IAEA, do you know what I received from several regulatory bodies? Advertising material about what a safety culture is and what the regulatory body should do. I will not indicate these countries, but I am absolutely sure that they have no safety culture. We, the experts, have done a lot over the years for the development of nuclear energy. Yes, there were problems, there were accidents, but we overcame them, we learned something. We understand that nuclear energy can make a huge contribution to the development of society. However, from a great good, a nuclear power plant can turn into a great evil. This is a weapon, a terrible weapon. The UN has already shown its insignificance; the same situation is with the IAEA. Therefore, when they say “give proposals, action plan”, a tool to ensure the implementation of these proposals is important. However, there is no such tool. Until there is no a peacekeeping mechanism, there can be no nuclear safety. Neither equipment quality, nor design quality, nor qualification quality of personnel solve this issue. We should understand that the safety culture cannot be maintained by lectures alone. There are situations where force and harsh sanctions should be used to enforce safety culture requirements. So far, humanity has not been able to develop this. Therefore, today's statements about safety of Ukraine's nuclear facilities are too optimistic.