Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets

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Bibliographic Details
Date:2018
Main Author: E. R. Smoljakov
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2018
Series:Cybernetics and Systems Analysis
Online Access:http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0000889044
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Journal Title:Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS

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Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS
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author E. R. Smoljakov
author_facet E. R. Smoljakov
author_sort E. R. Smoljakov
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institution Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS
language English
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publishDate 2018
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spelling open-sciencenbuvgovua-273262024-02-27T21:47:30Z Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets E. R. Smoljakov 1019-5262 2018 en Cybernetics and Systems Analysis http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0000889044 Article
spellingShingle Cybernetics and Systems Analysis
E. R. Smoljakov
Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
title Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
title_full Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
title_fullStr Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
title_full_unstemmed Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
title_short Strongest Pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
title_sort strongest pareto equilibrium for games on crossing sets
url http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0000889044
work_keys_str_mv AT ersmoljakov strongestparetoequilibriumforgamesoncrossingsets