Romanjuk, V. V. (2015). Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions.
Chicago-Zitierstil (17. Ausg.)Romanjuk, V. V. Uniform Sampling of Fundamental Simplexes as Sets of Players' Mixed Strategies in the Finite Noncooperative Game for Finding Equilibrium Situations with Possible Concessions. 2015.
MLA-Zitierstil (8. Ausg.)Romanjuk, V. V. Uniform Sampling of Fundamental Simplexes as Sets of Players' Mixed Strategies in the Finite Noncooperative Game for Finding Equilibrium Situations with Possible Concessions. 2015.
Achtung: Diese Zitate sind unter Umständen nicht zu 100% korrekt.