Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions

Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions

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Bibliographic Details
Date:2015
Main Author: V. V. Romanjuk
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2015
Series:International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics»
Online Access:http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001295471
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Journal Title:Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS

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Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS
id open-sciencenbuvgovua-68913
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spelling open-sciencenbuvgovua-689132024-04-16T13:36:40Z Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions V. V. Romanjuk 2786-6491 2015 en International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics» http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001295471 Article
institution Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS
collection Open-Science
language English
series International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics»
spellingShingle International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics»
V. V. Romanjuk
Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
format Article
author V. V. Romanjuk
author_facet V. V. Romanjuk
author_sort V. V. Romanjuk
title Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_short Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_full Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_fullStr Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_full_unstemmed Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_sort uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
publishDate 2015
url http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001295471
work_keys_str_mv AT vvromanjuk uniformsamplingoffundamentalsimplexesassetsofplayers039mixedstrategiesinthefinitenoncooperativegameforfindingequilibriumsituationswithpossibleconcessions
first_indexed 2025-07-22T06:03:01Z
last_indexed 2025-07-22T06:03:01Z
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