Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions

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Datum:2015
1. Verfasser: V. V. Romanjuk
Format: Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 2015
Schriftenreihe:International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics»
Online Zugang:http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001295471
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Назва журналу:Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS

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Library portal of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine | LibNAS
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author V. V. Romanjuk
author_facet V. V. Romanjuk
author_sort V. V. Romanjuk
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spelling open-sciencenbuvgovua-689132024-04-16T13:36:40Z Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions V. V. Romanjuk 2786-6491 2015 en International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics» http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001295471 Article
spellingShingle International Scientific Technical Journal «Problems of Control and Informatics»
V. V. Romanjuk
Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_full Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_fullStr Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_full_unstemmed Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_short Uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
title_sort uniform sampling of fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies in the finite noncooperative game for finding equilibrium situations with possible concessions
url http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001295471
work_keys_str_mv AT vvromanjuk uniformsamplingoffundamentalsimplexesassetsofplayersamp039mixedstrategiesinthefinitenoncooperativegameforfindingequilibriumsituationswithpossibleconcessions