Performance analysis of NIST post-quantum cryptosystems in the .NET environment

• Datum: 2026
• Hauptverfasser: Онай, М. В., Петренко, Ф. В.
• Format: Artikel
• Sprache: Ukrainisch
• Veröffentlicht: Інститут проблем реєстрації інформації НАН України 2026
• Schlagworte: cryptography; post-quantum cryptography; elliptic curve cryptography; software; software engineering; FIPS 203; FIPS 204; ML-KEM; ML-DSA; .NET 10; BenchmarkDotNet; performance; distributed systems
• Online Zugang: https://drsp.ipri.kiev.ua/article/view/358678
• Назва журналу: Data Recording, Storage & Processing

The rapid development of quantum computing poses a fundamental threat to classical asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which rely on the difficulty of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem for security. Shor's algorithm, when runs on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, reduces these problems to polynomial time, making widely used security protocols vulnerable. The «Harvest Now, Decrypt Later» strategy further increases the urgency of implementing quantum-resistant solutions before quantum computers capable of breaking encryption become available. This study presents the results of an experimental performance analysis of native post-quantum cryptographic implementations standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures. These implementations were evaluated within the .NET 10 managed runtime environment using BenchmarkDotNet on an Intel Core Ultra 9 processor with AVX2 instruction support. Benchmarking results show that lattice-based post-quantum algorithms deliver significant computational advantages over traditional methods. ML-KEM-768 exceeds ECC-P256 in key generation by more than 7 times, while encapsulation and decapsulation are roughly 90 and 50 times faster, respectively, addressing concerns about server-side performance. ML-DSA-65 signature verification takes about 39 µs, outperforming both RSA-4096 and ECDSA-P384 in the .NET environment. However, the main architectural challenge identified is the size of cryptographic objects. The ML-DSA-65 signature size of 3293 bytes exceeds the standard Ethernet MTU of 1500 bytes by 2.2 times, potentially causing IP packet fragmentation. Memory allocation analysis confirmed an efficient implementation with private-key objects storing only cryptographic seeds (54–86 bytes) thereby reducing garbage collection pressure. These findings offer an empirical foundation for designing quantum-resistant distributed systems and guide architectural decisions for hybrid cryptographic migration strategies in enterprise .NET environments. Tabl.: 1. Fig.: 4. Refs: 13 titles.